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Case Studies in Colonial Counter-Insurgency 
 
BRUCE COLLINS 
Sheffield Hallam University 
Email:  b.collins@shu.ac.uk 
 
This issue of the journal is dedicated to articles on the history of colonial counter-
insurgency. The whole subject has become increasingly controversial, with interest in 
part sparked by the Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The re-
emergence of interest in counter-insurgency doctrine has been well-documented in 
recent work by, for example, Keith L. Shimko for the United States and Michael 
Finch for France and in a thorough historiographical review by Ian Beckett for the 
United Kingdom. A simplified summary might run on the lines that nineteenth-
century interest in counter-insurgency operations was limited essentially to the 
application of light infantry tactics to such campaigns, with the addition of political 
efforts to win over selected tribal leaders. The French developed arguments that 
their colonial order also advanced a civilising mission, while the British claimed that 
their rule would promote economic progress and good governance. A more 
systematic study of counter-insurgency did not emerge until the decolonisation 
campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s.1 Interest then receded during the 1980s, partly 
under the pressure of the challenges of the intensified Cold War and partly because 
Western colonies had largely disappeared. The Americans in particular wanted no 
more Vietnams and the British had the very special 'urban guerrilla' campaign of 
Northern Ireland to manage. Such indifference, however, turned into occasionally 
frenetic interest from 2004 in reaction to the insurgencies against Western 
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan and the proliferation of non-state militias and 
armies particularly in the Muslim world. Given this revived interest in counter-
insurgency, Geraint Hughes’s paper on the wider question of military interventionism 
provides an incisive analysis of the context in which the case-studies of colonial 
counter-insurgency may be placed and an assessment of the many forms which 
interventions can take. Another purpose of this issue is to stress how widespread 
colonial counter-insurgency was. We have deliberately sought a range of national 
                                                
1Keith L. Shimko, The Iraq wars and the American Military Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); Michael P.M. Finch, A Progressive Occupation? The Gallieni-Lyautey Method and Colonial 
Pacification on Tonkin and Madagascar, 1885-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Ian F.W. 
Beckett, 'British counter-insurgency: a historiographical reflection', Small Wars and Insurgencies, 23 (2012), 
pp.781-798. See also: David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-67 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Daniel Whittingham, ‘“Savage warfare”: C.E. Caldwell, the roots of counter-
insurgency, and the nineteenth century context’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 23, Iss. 4-5 (2012), 
pp.591-607. 
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case-studies.2 In this regard, Thijs Brocades Zaalberg’s paper is particularly valuable in 
providing a re-assessment of the typically overlooked effort by the Netherlands to 
crush the independence movement and restore its authority in the Dutch East Indies 
after 1945. 
 
An initial definitional question is how far counter-insurgency doctrine is shaped by 
non-military factors. In the model offered by Beckett, for example, the main 
principles of counter-insurgency warfare include the need to understand insurgencies' 
political nature, to establish military-civil co-ordination, especially over intelligence, to 
isolate insurgents from the population, and to offer improvements to head off 
popular discontent. The military stick would be applied only when insurgents were 
isolated, either physically or ideologically, from the population.3 In this issue, Marie-
Cecile Thoral examines the difficulties of isolating insurgents and developing a 
broader appeal to the local population in the contentious case of Marshal Bugeaud’s 
subjugation of inland Algeria in the 1840s. For the Americans, the celebrated or 
notorious Counterinsurgency Field Manual of 2007 devoted much attention to 
promoting good governance and social improvement, with counter-insurgency 
operations almost becoming 'armed social work'.4 To press the point home, David 
Kilcullen's The Accidental Guerrilla stressed the negative multiplier effects of attacking 
insurgents and inflicting heavy casualties upon them. Such lethal encounters simply 
bred more guerrillas among those whose family members, neighbours, and friends 
had been killed or wounded.5 The military component of much counter-insurgency 
doctrine has therefore been largely confined to policing and patrolling in a manner 
which builds confidence in the civilian population and denies space to the insurgents, 
and to working with civil authorities to amass intelligence about insurgents' 
organisation and to help break insurgents' cells. 
 
A direct challenge to this approach has been mounted by Mark Moyar. He argues 
that an undue emphasis on network-centric and population-centric warfare has 
obscured the fact that insurgencies are initiated, expanded and led by talented elites. 
It is they who galvanise resistance and attract support; economic deprivation, he 
argues, has not been the determining factor in explaining the emergence or success 
of an insurgency. It follows that 'counter-insurgency is ‘'leader-centric'’ warfare, a 
contest between elites in which the elite with superiority in certain leadership 
                                                
2 Four of the papers were first given at a workshop at Sheffield Hallam University on 27 June 2013; the 
financial assistance of the university’s Humanities Research Centre and other participants’ contributions 
are gratefully acknowledged. 
3 Beckett, 'British counter-insurgency', pp.782-783. 
4 Although published online by the US Army in 2006, the manual also appeared as a book in 2007. US 
Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field-Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
5 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (London: Hurst, 2009), pp.34-38. 
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attributes usually wins'.6 The priority is therefore to develop those who have the 
attributes and talents to lead and to empower them to take command in counter-
insurgency campaigning while ensuring that they have the resources and political 
support to exercise their judgement and take decisive action: ‘The United States 
must develop its most talented counter-insurgency leaders and those of its allies and 
place them into positions where they can wage war without fetters, their unshakable 
initiative and creative brilliance streaming across the plains and mountains’.7 Such 
actions are clearly directed at overseas interventions which in many analysts’ eyes 
are generically linked to ‘colonial’ campaigning.  
 
The suggestion that war might be waged ‘without fetters’ creates an obvious 
challenge for modern assessments of counter-insurgency. Culturally and intellectually, 
Western societies increasingly not only reject but also deplore their imperial past 
and find warfare, other than to defend one’s homeland, an increasingly problematic 
phenomenon. At the same time, long-standing Western ideas of individualism have 
expanded in the last two decades into a legal and legislative preoccupation with 
enshrining and protecting human rights as a distinctive goal of public discourse and 
political action. Such cultural, ethical, legal and political concerns are very difficult to 
square with what happens when the norms of civil society are suspended in 
conditions of war. 
 
In fact, one of the most significant developments in modern historiography has been 
the exploration of what in the past tended to be treated as the underbelly of 
counter-insurgency operations, the brutality which such operations involved. For 
example, the best-selling study of Delhi during the Indian Mutiny-Rebellion by 
William Dalrymple is less concerned with the technical military problems faced and 
overcome by the British in besieging, storming and taking Delhi than with the 
brutality of their treatment of both mutineers and the wider civilian population.8 The 
army assembled at Delhi is examined less as a complex organisation struggling to 
master immense challenges than as an instrument of vengeance, with attention given 
to individual officers' psychological journeys as they became increasingly indifferent to 
the slaughter they inflicted.9  
 
Recent historical revisionism, developing criticisms made in the 1950s and 1960s of 
French, British and American military excesses in counter-insurgency conflicts, is in 
part a reaction against claims made for the political effectiveness of counter-
                                                
6 Mark Moyar, A Question of Command. Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009), pp.3-4. 
7 Moyar, A Question of Command, pp.2-3 & pp.285-286.  
8 William Dalrymple, The Last Mughal. The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi, 1857 (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 
pp.348-339, pp.362-366, pp.372-374, pp.385-391, pp.401-409 & pp.411-416. 
9 Dalrymple, The Last Mughal, pp.197-201, pp.313-316 & p.405. 
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insurgency policies. In this respect, Sir Robert Thompson offered a classic statement 
of the ideal. Although he noted that governments might enact tough restrictions 
during an emergency, he insisted in 1966 that such impositions would only work if 
they were fair and applied to all: 
 
There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with 
guerilla [sic] actions for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses 
being that the processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal 
safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for an insurgency and 
that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this 
morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a 
government than it solves.10 
 
If this was the ideal, historians are bound to investigate the reality. For example, Huw 
Bennett has challenged the notion that the British applied minimum force and upheld 
high standards of legality in suppressing the Mau Mau rising among Kenya's Kikuyu 
people in 1952-56. In Kenya, patrols extensively ignored the restrictions on military 
force which the commander-in-chief, Sir George Erskine, sought to impose on 
operations. About 11,500 of the 24,000 violent deaths resulting from the emergency 
occurred from the non-combat or militarily unauthorised, if implicitly condoned, use 
of force. While this level of killing, directed essentially against the 1.4 million Kikuyu, 
was scarcely genocidal, it was part of an oppressive campaign involving the extensive 
re-settlement of the population into government- controlled villages.11 
 
The impact of such mounting revisionism is demonstrated in Douglas Porch’s 
blistering re-assessment of counter-insurgency doctrine. His targets are myths about 
successful insurgency operations in the past, the sloppy or inaccurate deployment of 
them to support current doctrine, and the entire thrust of population-centric 
counter-insurgency as described by the US field manual. His immediate argument is 
that American military performance in Iraq was distorted by the claim that a new 
approach to COIN operations transformed the conflict from 2006. According to 
Porch, ‘COIN offers a doctrine of escapism… - a flight from democratic civilian 
control, even from modernity, into an anachronistic, romanticized, orientalist vision 
that projects quintessentially western values, and Western prejudices, onto non-
Western societies’. 12 Acknowledging George Decker’s insistence that ‘any good 
                                                
10  Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency. Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1966), pp.52-53. 
11 Huw Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau. The British Army and Counter-insurgency in the Kenya Emergency 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.8, pp.192-196, pp.219-228, p.231; see also Michael 
Burleigh, Small Wars, Faraway Places. The Genesis of the Modern World 1945-65(London: Macmillan, 2013). 
12 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency. Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p.330. 
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soldier can handle guerrillas’, by adapting military practice to particular conditions, 
Porch dissects the assertion, beginning from the 1840s with French officers in Algeria, 
that ‘small wars’ are an especially challenging branch of warfare requiring distinctive 
and hard-won skills. Instead, he argues that much French and British colonial 
campaigning was essentially insensitive to local social and political realities and 
depended instead on severe, often savage, and sometimes indiscriminate force.13  
 
One response is to argue that such defects would be avoided by restricting the 
presence of foreign counterinsurgents. Kilcullen argues for the importance of 
recruiting manpower from within indigenous populations rather than relying on 
foreign forces. The costs are lower and the potential military gains are higher, for 
local forces do not require elaborate bases, are familiar with the indigenous languages 
and culture, and not rotated out after short tours. Mobilisation should therefore be 
based upon 'local partnerships and local security forces that protect communities and 
guard against extremist presence'.14 But indigenous troops and police can be equally if 
not more brutal than foreign colonial or interventionist forces. Ethnic hostilities 
played a major role in the killing which occurred during the Mau Mau rising. Iraq’s 
highest number of monthly ‘insurgent’ or ‘terrorist’ attacks – some 3,500 of them - 
to that date occurred in May 2006, when there was a change of government between 
Iraqi parties and at a time when 263,000 Iraqi soldiers and police had been trained by 
the US.15 
 
The focus on indigenous forces opens up two important subjects for further analysis. 
First, how far did governments engaged in counter-insurgency have police forces 
capable of providing intelligence for military operations against insurgents? This is a 
topic upon which Martin Thomas has worked extensively for the twentieth-century 
French empire.16 In this issue, David French provides a fascinating case-study of the 
operational demands which the insurgency in Cyprus in the 1950s placed upon the 
security service’s resources. Second, how far was the recruitment of indigenous 
forces itself part of a counter-insurgency strategy? My paper argues for the dual 
importance of mobilising local forces against the threat of disturbance in the Bombay 
presidency of British India in 1857; the process secured necessary manpower but 
also reinforced support among the indigenous population. The management of local 
and regional ethnic rivalries, which is in part the subject of Nir Arielli’s case-study of 
the Italians in Libya, raised questions about colonial authorities’ and intervening 
powers’ categorisation of and appeals to ethnic and tribal groups. The idea of martial 
‘races’ was potent and self-reinforcing among many men within tribes or larger 
                                                
13 Porch, Counterinsurgency, p.250, p.266, p.289. 
14 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, p.271. 
15 Bob Woodward, State of Denial (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p.434, pp.472-473, p.480. 
16  Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence. Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007). 
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groups so designated. The composition of indigenous forces, including their place 
within their societies, is a topic which recurs in a number of papers here and merits 
wider re-assessment.17 
                                                
17 See Heather Streets, Martial Races. The military, race and masculinity in British imperial culture, 1857-1914 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). An interesting extension to seafaring races is Daniel O. 
Spence, Colonial Naval Culture and British Imperialism, 1922-67 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2015). 
